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Constitutional Law-IGNORING AN INCOMPETENT PERSON'S
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO FORGO LIFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT-
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990)
CHRISTOPHER SUPERNOR*
N Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,I the United
States Supreme Court recognized for the first time that a compe-
tent person has a constitutionally protected right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment. 2 When the Court decided Cruzan, however, Nancy
Cruzan was incompetent and in a persistent vegetative state.' If Nan-
cy's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment was to be exercised at
all, it had to be done by a proxy. After it became apparent that Nancy
would always be in a vegetative state, her parents sought a court order
directing the removal of their daughter's feeding and hydration tube.4
The Missouri Supreme Court refused to honor the wishes of Nan-
cy's parents on the grounds that her parents had failed to present clear
and convincing evidence that Nancy would have chosen to withdraw
her life-sustaining treatment.' In Cruzan, the United States Supreme
Court held that the United States Constitution did not forbid Missouri
from requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent per-
son's wishes before life-sustaining treatment could be withdrawn. 6 The
* I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Marjorie Makar and Kim Stott for their en-
couragement and comments.
1. 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990). Cruzan was a 5-4 decision. Justices White, O'Connor, Scalia,
and Kennedy joined the majority opinion, which was written by Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justice
O'Connor filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring); Justice Scalia also
filed a concurring opinion. Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justices Marshall and Blackmun
joined the dissenting opinion, which was written by Justice Brennan. Id. at 2863 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Justice Stevens dissented separately. Id. at 2878 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
2. Id. at 2851-52.
3. Dr. Fred Plum, professor and chairman of the Department of Neurology at Cornell,
who coined the term "persistent vegetative state," describes the vegetative state as follows:
Vegetative state describes a body which is functioning entirely in terms of its internal
controls. It maintains temperature. It maintains heart beat and pulmonary ventilation.
It maintains digestive activity. It maintains reflex activity of muscles and nerves for
low level conditioned responses. But there is no behavioral evidence of either self-
awareness or awareness of the surroundings in a learned manner.
In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403, 529 A.2d 434, 438 (1987). See infra notes 29-64 and accompany-
ing text.
4. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2844-45.
5. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 426-27 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cru-
zan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
6. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852-53.
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Court's decision also allowed Missouri to assert an unqualified inter-
est in preserving life without considering the quality of Nancy Cru-
zan's life.7
Quality of life is the value that the continuation of life has for a
person. No one should be allowed to decide that another person's life
should be discontinued because the quality of that life is inadequate.
If quality of life was a legitimate issue, persons with all manner of
handicaps might find the state seeking to terminate their lives. There-
fore, refusing to judge the quality of another's life is necessary to pro-
tect individuals with diminished mental capacities.
However, a persistent vegetative state can be distinguished from any
medical condition that involves a diminished mental capacity. Those
in persistent vegetative states have no cognitive functions and are
completely unaware of their surroundings.8 They are little more than
collections of bodily organs. For these people, quality of life must be
considered in order to reach a decision that is in their best interests.
In determining whether to forgo life-sustaining treatment for an in-
competent person, the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment 9 requires that a state must act in a way that respects the
person's best interests.' 0 By ignoring the quality of Nancy Cruzan's
life the state of Missouri acted against Nancy's best interests and ig-
nored her constitutional right to forgo life-sustaining treatment. Cru-
zan is the only case in which a court has decided to continue life-
sustaining treatment for a person in a persistent vegetative state. How-
ever, the Missouri Supreme Court is not the only court that can be
accused of ignoring an incompetent person's constitutional right."
Other courts have struggled with the medical, legal, and ethical is-
sues involved in determining what procedural safeguards are appropri-
ate to preserve an incompetent person's constitutional right to refuse
7. Id. at 2853.
8. Cranford, The Persistent Vegetative State: The Medical Reality (Getting the Facts
Straight), 18 HASTNGS CENTER REP. 27, 28 (1988).
9. "No state shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2879 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
11. Many courts permit the family of an incompetent person to decide whether to forgo
life-sustaining treatment provided that the family can reach the same decision that the incompe-
tent person would have if he had been able to do so. See infra notes 103-115 and accompanying
text. This is clearly impossible when the incapacitated person always has been incompetent or is
an infant. In those cases there is absolutely no evidence of what the incompetent person would
choose. However, courts have permitted the family of an incompetent to decide whether to forgo
life-sustaining treatment when there is absolutely no evidence of what the incompetent person
would have done. See infra notes 112-114, 193-194 and accompanying text.
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life-sustaining treatment.1 2 This Note criticizes these courts for failing
to distinguish the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for people in
persistent vegetative states from all other right to die cases. This Note
recommends two procedures that will safeguard the right to refuse or
continue life-sustaining treatment for all persons who are incompe-
tent. One procedure applies only to persons in persistent vegetative
states. The other procedure applies to any other medical condition
that might present itself in a right to die case. This Note also hopes to
dispel the common misconceptions concerning the nature of the per-
sistent vegetative state and to justify logically why courts must distin-
guish cases regarding the withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment for
persons in persistent vegetative states.
I. THE FACTS
On January 11, 1983, Nancy Beth Cruzan suffered serious injuries
when she lost control of her automobile.'" Trooper Dale Penn of the
Missouri Highway Patrol discovered Nancy lying face down in a
ditch, approximately thirty-five feet from her automobile.'4 Nancy did
not have any detectable respiratory or cardiac functions. 5 Shortly
thereafter, paramedics arrived at the accident scene and successfully
revived those functions.' 6 By that time, however, Nancy's brain had
been deprived of oxygen for approximately twelve to fourteen min-
utes.' 7 Permanent brain damage occurs when the brain is deprived of
oxygen for approximately six minutes or more.'
Following the accident, Nancy remained in a coma for three weeks
and then progressed to an unconscious state.' 9 Although Nancy re-
mained unconscious, her respiration and circulation no longer re-
quired artificial maintenance. 20 Nancy also was able to take nutrition
orally; however, a feeding and hydration tube was surgically im-
planted to ease the feeding process. 2'
Seven years after her accident, when the United States Supreme
Court decided Cruzan, Nancy remained unconscious and completely
12. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2888 n.21 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
13. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 410-11 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub noma.,
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 411.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
1991]
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oblivious to her environment except for primitive reflexes. 22 She was
completely and permanently disabled. 23 "All four of her limbs are se-
verely contracted; her fingernails cut into her wrists. She is inconti-
nent of bowel and bladder. The most intimate aspects of her existence
are exposed to and controlled by strangers." 24 Nancy Cruzan's parents
described their daughter as "an unconscious shell in a room full of
strangers. " 2
While Nancy would never recover, she was not terminally ill.26 Med-
ical experts testified that she could have survived another thirty
years. 27 Nancy Cruzan existed in a persistent vegetative state.28
II. THE PERSISTENT VEGETATIVE STATE
A. The Medical Reality of the Persistent Vegetative State
Before undertaking any legal analysis, it is essential to have a com-
plete understanding of the persistent vegetative state, including the
similarities and differences between it and other syndromes. The per-
sistent vegetative state is a distinct neurological impairment of the
brain and is distinguishable from a coma or brain death. 29
The brain controls a person's cognitive functions, such as thoughts,
understanding, and awareness, as well as vegetative functions, such as
respiration and primitive reflexes.3 0 The cognitive functions occur in
the outer layers of the brain or, more specifically, in the cerebral cor-
tex.3 ' The vegetative functions are controlled in the lower center of the
brain or, more specifically, in the brain stem. 32
Brain death or whole brain death occurs when both the brain's cog-
nitive and vegetative functions cease to exist. 33 Brain death is a mod-
22. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 (1990).
23. Id. at 2869 n.10 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
24. Id. (citing to App. to Petition for Cert. A93 and Brief for Respondent Guardian Ad
Litem 2).
25. Tallahassee Democrat, June 26, 1990, at IA, col. 1.
26. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Cranford, supra note 8, at 27-28.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. The criteria used to determine brain death resulted from recommendations by the Ad
Hoc Committee of Harvard Medical School. Harvard Medical School Ad Hoc Committee, A
Definition of Irreversible Coma, 205 J. A.M.A. 337 (1968).
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ern medical and legal definition of death . 4 When a patient is in a
persistent vegetative state, the brain's cognitive functions have ceased,
but the vegetative functions remain.35 With a coma, the brain's cogni-
tive functions have ceased and the vegetative functions are impaired.36
Therefore, a person in a coma or persistent vegetative state is not le-
gally dead.17
Brain damage occurs when the brain is denied oxygen for a short
period of time. 8 The cerebral cortex has a high metabolic rate, so it is
the part of the brain that is most sensitive to a lack of oxygen.3 9 The
brain stem, while not completely immune to a lack of oxygen, is more
resilient than the cerebral cortex.4 After four to six minutes of com-
plete loss of oxygen to the brain, the cerebral cortex may suffer exten-
sive destruction, but the brain stem will be relatively unharmed .4
After the brain is deprived of oxygen, a person often will become
comatose. 42 -The coma could be transient and persist for only a few
weeks, or it could be chronic and irreversible. 41
A coma is a state of sleep-like unarousability resulting from exten-
sive damage to the brain stem. 44 A person in this condition has im-
paired cough, gag, and swallow reflexes.4 5 These impairments account
34. The common law definition of death was equated with the cessation of respiration and
the circulation of blood. D. MEYERS, MEDicO-LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF DEATH AND DYING § 3:1
(1981). However, the definition of death has changed as medical advances have created the abil-
ity to maintain lung and heart functions artificially in patients whose brains were irreversibly
damaged. Id. at §§ 4:1, 4:7.
35. Cranford, supra note 8, at 27.
36. Id. at 28.
37. D. MEYERS, supra note 34, at § 4:10 (brain death should not be equated with a coma or
a persistent vegetative state).
38. Cranford, supra note 8, at 28.
39. Id.
40. The brain stem has survived without oxygen for as long as fifteen minutes. D. MEYERS,
supra note 34, at § 4:2.
41. Cranford, supra note 8, at 28. The Missouri trial court determined that permanent
brain damage generally results after the brain is deprived of oxygen for six minutes. Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2845 (1990). Nancy Cruzan was deprived of
oxygen for twelve to fourteen minutes. Id.
42. Cranford, supra note 8, at 28.
43. Id. A study of 215 comatose patients revealed that 60% of comas are transient comas.
Levati, Farina, Vecchi, Rossanda & Marrubini, Prognosis of Severe Head Injuries, 57 J. NEURO-
SURGERY 779 (1982) [hereinafter Levati]. The majority of the patients in a transient coma recov-
ered fully or progressed to a mentally disabled state. Id. The remaining 40% of the comatose
patients died. Id. This author is defining a chronic and irreversible coma as a condition in which
a comatose person remains in a coma until his death. However, some doctors assert that the
phrase "chronic and irreversible coma" is misleading, Cranford, supra note 8, at 28, because the
lifespan of a truly comatose patient is typically limited to weeks or months, which is not long
enough to be appropriately characterized as "chronic." Id.
44. Cranford, supra note 8, at 28.
45. Id.
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for the frequent and often fatal respiratory infections that develop in
persons who are comatose.4 A person who is comatose can be de-
scribed as terminally ill with a life expectancy of six months to a
year. 47
After a transient coma, a person's condition can evolve to one of
eyes-open unconsciousness; that is, the vegetative state.4 The transient
coma results from a temporary dysfunction of the brain stem. 49 A per-
son in a fully developed, persistent vegetative state has a variety of
normal brain stem functions, including the protective gag reflexes and
the ability to breathe without a respirator. 0 Because people in vegeta-
tive states have a gag reflex, it is theoretically possible, but extremely
impractical, to feed these patients by hand.5 Most patients in vegeta-
tive states are fed nutritional fluids by medical means such as nasogas-
tric tubing or gastrostomy.12 It is not uncommon for persons in
vegetative states to survive for a number of years."
People in persistent vegetative states experience a total loss of cog-
nitive functions. They are completely unconscious and unaware of
themselves or their environment. The capacities for genuine human
thinking and emotions, and for experiencing pain and suffering at a
conscious level depend on the cerebral cortex function.5 4 While a per-
son may appear to exhibit signs of conscious human suffering, these
are merely brain stem actions of a primitive, reflexive nature.55 Those
in persistent vegetative states cannot experience pain and suffering be-
cause they lack the cognitive ability to do S0.56
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Less than 207o f all patients who survive a coma will remain in a persistent vegetative
state. Levati, supra note 43, at 779. A separate study concluded that up to 12%0 of patients who
survive a coma will remain in a persistent vegetative state. Feinberg & Ferry, A Fate Worse Than
Death, The Persistent Vegetative State in Childhood, 138 AM. J. DIsEASES CHILDREN 128 (1984).
49: Cranford, supra note 8, at 28.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 31.
52. Id.
53. The longest documented survival period of a patient in a persistent vegetative state is 37
years and 111 days. Id.
54. Position of the American Academy of Neurology on Certain Aspects of the Care and
Management of the Persistent Vegetative State Patient, 39 NEUROLOGY 125 (1989).
55. Cranford, supra note 8, at 31.
56. The American Academy of Neurology has filed amicus curiae briefs in several recent
right to die cases, including the Cruzan case, which state unequivocally that patients in a persist-
ent vegetative state cannot experience pain and suffering. Munsat, Stuart & Cranford, Guide-
lines on the Vegetative State: Commentary on the American Academy of Neurology Statement,
39 NEUROLOGY 123, 123-24 (1989).
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A physician skilled in neurological impairments can diagnose the
persistent vegetative state with a reasonably high degree of accuracy
within months of the original injury." However, the diagnosis is not
foolproof, and a few documented cases exist where a patient has re-
covered cognitive functions after being diagnosed as being in a persist-
ent vegetative state.3 8 Part of the difficulty of obtaining a correct
diagnosis is the lack of broadly accepted, specific medical criteria.3 9
The primary basis for the diagnosis of a persistent vegetative state is
careful clinical observation of the patient6 There is a promising test
for confirming the diagnosis of the persistent vegetative state on the
horizon. The positron emission tomography (PET) scan6' quantita-
tively measures the metabolic rate of the cerebral cortex.6 This is im-
portant because consciousness cannot exist below certain metabolic
rates. 63 But presently the accuracy of the PET scan is unverified, and
only a few centers in the country have the necessary equipment."
B. Should the Legal Definition of Death Include the Persistent
Vegetative State?
The entire controversy concerning what conditions justify the with-
drawal of life-sustaining treatment from a person in a persistent vege-
tative state would disappear if the legal definition of death was altered
to include the persistent vegetative state.6 It is always permissible to
57. Cranford, supra note 8, at 29.
58. Id. at 29-30. See also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 425, 497
N.E.2d 626, 630 (1986) (likelihood of a patient in a persistent vegetative state regaining cognitive
functioning is substantially less than one percent).
59. Cranford, supra note 8, at 29-30. Physicians can disagree about whether a patient is in a
persistent vegetative state. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 403-07, 529 A.2d 434, 438-41 (1987). A
nursing home produced two medical experts who contended that Nancy Jobes was severely brain
damaged, although one said she fell "slightly outside of [his] operational definition of the per-
sistent vegetative state." Id. at 404-07, 529 A.2d at 439-40. On the other hand, Doctors Plum
and Levy, who have devoted their careers to the diagnosis and treatment of the persistent vegeta-
tive state, insisted that Nancy Jobes was in such a state. Id. at 408-09, 529 A.2d at 441. Despite
the conflicting evidence, the trial court held that there was clear and convincing evidence that
Nancy Jobes was in a persistent vegetative state. Id. at 409, 529 A.2d at 441.
60. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 263 n.3 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989) (stating
the position of the American Academy of Neurology), approved, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla. 1990).
61. The Supreme Court of New Jersey used the results of a PET scan as evidence that
Nancy Jobes was in a persistent vegetative state. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. at 404, 529 A.2d at 439.
62. Cranford, supra note 8, at 30.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. [The Cruzan] case could have been the perfect occasion for the United States Su-
preme Court finally to define "death." Instead, time and money were wasted, and the
agony of the Cruzan family lengthened, while judges discussed Nancy Cruzan's "right
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discontinue treatment when a person is legally dead. In fact, life-sup-
port machines that maintain a body's respiratory and cardiac func-
tions are routinely discontinued when a person is declared brain dead.
Why shouldn't the legal definition of death be expanded to include a
person who is permanently unconscious?
Currently, there are two problems with altering the legal definition
of death to include the persistent vegetative state. The first problem is
one of education and awareness. The common law definition of death
was the cessation of circulatory and respiratory functions.6 Recent
advances in medical science have forced the legal definition of death
to include whole brain death. However, the public and even the ma-
jority of physicians remain unaware of the correct legal definition of
death. 67 In fact, nineteen percent of physicians and nurses likely to be
involved in organ procurement for transplantation had a concept of
"death" that included a person in a persistent vegetative state.6 Until
health care employees and the public are properly educated and all of
the myths about the persistent vegetative state are dispelled, revising
the legal definition of death is not advisable. Imposing a definition of
death that the majority of the population cannot understand or be-
lieve would cause an unacceptable amount of strife. 69
A second problem with altering the legal definition of death is the
current uncertain accuracy of diagnosing the persistent vegetative
state. In one right to die case, four physicians were unable to agree on
whether the patient was in a persistent vegetative state. 70 Furthermore,
there have been documented cases of people recovering after they
were diagnosed as being in persistent vegetative states.7' While such
to die." She was not in a persistent vegetative state. Hers was not a life or death
situation. Nancy Cruzan was dead, period. And dead people don't need a "right to
die."
N.Y. Times, Jan. 8, 1991, at A20, col. 4 (Dr. J. Neuschatz's letter to the editor).
66. See D. MEYERS, supra note 34.
67. Youngner, Landefeld, Coulton, Juknialis & Leary, 'Brain Death' and Organ Retrieval:
A Cross-Sectional Survey of Knowledge and Concepts Among Health Professionals, 261 J.
A.M.A. 2205 (1989) (only 35010 of the physicians and nurses polled correctly identified the legal
and medical criteria for determining death).
68. Id.
69. Sharon Orr, one of the nurses who attended Nancy Cruzan, was frustrated and angered
over Judge Teel's court order to remove Nancy's feeding and hydration tube. N.Y. Times, Dec.
16, 1990, at 29, col. 6. "The Humane Society won't let you starve your dog," commented Ms.
Orr. Id. On December 18, 1990, 19 demonstrators were arrested when they entered the hospital
with an intent to reattach Nancy Cruzan's feeding and hydration tube. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27,
1990, at Al, col. 1.
70. See supra note 59.
71. Cranford, supra note 8, at 29-30. See also Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398
Mass. 417, 425 n.15, 497 N.E.2d 626, 630 n.15 (1986) (Dr. Cranford knew of only two cases
CRUZAN
cases are extremely rare, the method of diagnosis must be literally
foolproof and uniformly accepted before the persistent vegetative
state can be included in the legal definition of death. The PET scan
eventually may solve the present difficulties in diagnosing the persist-
ent vegetative state, but its accuracy is presently unconfirmed and the
necessary equipment to perform the test is generally not available.
Therefore, it is not now appropriate to alter the legal definition of
death. Yet even if a person in a persistent vegetative state is techni-
cally alive, it is an existence with only the lowest life functions.
C. The Economic Reality of the Persistent Vegetative State
This section is not meant to suggest that decisions regarding the re-
moval of life-sustaining procedures should be based on anything but
ethical and moral grounds. However, the growing number of people
in persistent vegetative states, combined with rapidly increasing health
care costs, will eventually provide a strong economic motivation for
state legislatures to alter the legal definition of death. Two decades
ago patients who could not swallow and digest food died because in-
travenous feeding tubes could not provide enough calories to maintain
a patient for more than a short time. Today high-caloric feeding tubes
can keep a person alive for years. 72 As many as 10,000 patients pres-
ently are being maintained in persistent vegetative states in the United
States, and the number is expected to increase significantly. 73 The cost
of maintaining these patients is an ever-growing burden on the na-
tional health care system. 74 The increasing economic strain has
prompted a number of commentators to suggest that the limitation of
medical life support may become a necessary cost-containment meas-
ure .7
when someone in a persistent vegetative state for more than one month later regained cognitive
awareness. He testified that neither person recovered completely: "They were left in a state that
some people, including myself . . . would [view] as worse than the vegetative state.")
72. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2877-78 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). See also In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 19 n.2, 355 A.2d 647, 652 n.2 (1976) (Dr. Julius
Korein's testimony).
73. Cranford, supra note 8, at 31.
74. The cost of health care to maintain a woman who was in a persistent vegetative state for
17 years was estimated at $6,104,590. Feinberg & Ferry, supra note 48, at 130. The annual na-
tional health bill for patients in persistent vegetative states has been estimated as ranging from
$120 million to $1.2 billion. Cranford, supra note 8, at 32. Nancy Cruzan's medical expenses
were approximately $112,000 per year. N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1990, at Al, col. 1.
75. The increasing strain on the nation's medical resources has prompted a number of com-
mentators to suggest a reduction of care for those patients whose care is marginally useful. Alex-
ander, Death By Directive, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 67, 73 (1988). "There are thousands of
PVS patients occupying beds in health care institutions and consuming financial resources. In a
search for items to cut from the budget, years of support for the permanently unconscious may
seem to some a tempting place to start." Wolf, The Persistent Problem of PVS, 18 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 26 (1988).
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This author is calling the reader's attention to this potential eco-
nomic crisis to emphasize that state legislatures should address the
problem of redefining death before such a crisis occurs. This is be-
cause sponsors of bills to redefine death to include people in persistent
vegetative states will meet opposition based on a perception that they
are attempting to rescue a bankrupt health care system at the expense
of the unfortunate. This opposition will cloud the true purposes of
such bills, which is that the best interest of persons in persistent vege-
tative states is to terminate life-sustaining treatment. In other words,
the proponents of bills to redefine death will be unable to seize the
moral high ground unless they act before the inevitable economic cri-
sis.
III. BACKGROUND
For nearly a century, courts have recognized an individual's right to
be free from bodily invasion. 76 This notion of bodily integrity is em-
bodied in the requirement that informed consent from a competent
patient generally is required for all medical treatment. 77 The logical
corollary of the informed-consent doctrine is that a competent person
has the right to refuse medical treatment. Many state courts have
based a competent person's right to refuse medical treatment on the
common law right of informed consent. 71 Other courts have held that
a competent person's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is
both a constitutional and a common law right. 79
While it is clear that an incompetent person also has a right to re-
fuse medical treatment, 0 problems arise when one tries to determine
76. Union Pac. Ry. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
77. "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall
be done with his own body .... Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), overruled on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 143
N.E.2d 3, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3 (1957).
78. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 738-39, 370
N.E.2d 417, 423-24 (1977); In re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 376-77, 420 N.E.2d 64, 70-71 (1981),
cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858 (1981).
79. See Foody v. Manchester Memorial Hosp., 482 A.2d 713, 717-18 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1984); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., 398 Mass. 417, 430, 497 N.E.2d 626, 633 (1986); In
re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 339-40 (Minn. 1984) (court recognized a com-
mon law right but limited its holding to a constitutional and statutory right); In re Conroy, 98
N.J. 321, 346-48, 486 A.2d 1209, 1221-23 (1985) (court recognized a constitutional right but
limited its holding to an application of the common law right).
80. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 219 n.18, 741 P.2d 674, 686 n.18. (1987). How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court has implied that an incompetent person does not have the
same constitutional right to refuse medical treatment as a competent person. See infra notes 131-
34 and accompanying text.
The Court said: "An incompetent person is not able to make an informed and voluntary
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how an incompetent can exercise this right. An incompetent person is
unable to make an informed and voluntary decision.8' Therefore, if an
incompetent person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is to be
exercised at all, it must be done by some form of proxy.8 2 Both the
courts and the legislatures have struggled with the medical, legal, and
ethical issues involved in determining who should be the substitute de-
cision-maker and what conditions justify the termination of life-sus-
taining procedures for an incompetent person.
A. Methods for Avoiding the Situation of an Incompetent Who Has
No Expressed Treatment Preference
Most states have attempted to avoid the situation of an incompetent
person who has no expressed treatment preference by enacting legisla-
tion that allows an individual to execute a living will.83 Living wills
choice to exercise a hypothetical right to refuse treatment or any other right." Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990). Although this statement is unclear,
it probably does not stand for the principle that an incompetent person does not have a constitu-
tional right to refuse medical treatment. People do not forfeit their constitutional rights merely
because they are incompetent. The true issue is what procedural safeguards must be adopted in
order to preserve the incompetent's constitutional right to refuse medical treatment. Therefore,
the best interpretation of the Court's statement is that it merely emphasizes the need for proce-
dural safeguards.
81. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2852.
82. Id.
83. Forty states and the District of Columbia have enacted legislation recognizing living
wills. See Natural Death Act, ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 18.12.010-
.100 (1986); Medical Treatment Decision Act, Axiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210 (1986
& Supp. 1990); Arkansas Rights of the Terminally Ill or Permanently Unconscious Act, ARK.
STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-201 to -218 (Supp. 1989); Natural Death Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1991); Colorado Medical Treatment Decision Act, COLO. REV. STAT.
§§ 15-18-101 to -113 (1987 & Supp. 1990); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 19a-570 to -575 (West
Supp. 1991); Delaware Death with Dignity Act, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983);
Natural Death Act of 1981, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (1989); Life-Prolonging Proce-
dure Act of Florida, FLA. STAT. §§ 765.01-.15 (1989); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 &
Supp. 1990); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 327D-1 to -27 (Supp. 1989); Natural Death Act, IDAHO CODE
§§ 39-4501 to -4509 (1985 & Supp. 1990); Living Will Act, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110 1/2, paras.
701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); Living Wills and Life-Prolonging Procedures Act, IND. CODE
ANN. §§ 16-8-11-1 to -22 (Burns 1990); Life-sustaining Procedures Act, IOWA CODE ANN. §§
144A.1-.11 (West 1989); Natural Death Act, KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 65-28,101 to -28,109 (1985);
Kentucky Living Will Act, KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 311.622-644 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill Supp.
1990); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 40:1299.58.1-.10 (West Supp. 1991); Uniform Rights of the Ter-
minally Ill Act, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18A, §§ 5-701 to -714 (Supp. 1990); MD. HEALTH-
GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (1990 & Supp. 1990); Adult Health Care Decisions Act, MINN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 145B.01-.17 (West Supp. 1991); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to -121 (Supp.
1990); Mo. ANN. REV. STAT. §§ 459.010-.055 (Vernon Supp. 1991); Living Will Act, MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -104, -110, -201 to -204, -206 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
449.540-690 (Michie 1986 & Supp. 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 137-H:1 to -H:16 (1990);
Right to Die Act, N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -II (1986 & 1990); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320
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allow competent people to execute declarations that they would refuse
life-prolonging medical treatment in the event of a terminal illness and
an accompanying inability to refuse such treatment as a result of in-
competence.84
Some states also have enacted statutes that specifically authorize in-
dividuals to appoint surrogates to make medical treatment decisions in
the event that individuals are rendered incompetent."5 Furthermore, at
least one state court has held that a general power of attorney implic-
itly grants the authority to make medical treatment decisions.8 6
1. The Living Will87
There are two reasons living wills have not eliminated the problems
that arise when people become incompetent and have never expressed
to -322 (1990); Oklahoma Natural Death Act, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101-3111 (West
Supp. 1991); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050-090 (1983); Death With Dignity Act, S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 44-77-10 to -160 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1990); Tennessee Right to Natural Death Act, TENN.
CODE ANN. §§ 32-11-101 to -110 (Supp. 1990); Natural Death Act, TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
ANN. §§ 672.001-.021 (Vernon Supp. 1991); Personal Choice and Living Will Act, UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1990); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251-5262 (1987); Natural
Death Act of Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54.1-2981 to -2992 (1988 & Supp. 1990); Natural
Death Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 70.122.010-.905 (Supp. 1991); West Virginia Natural
Death Act, W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1991); WIs. STAT. ANN. §§ 154.01-.15 (West 1989);
WYo. STAT. §§ 35-22-101 to -109 (1988 & Supp. 1990). See also Uniform Rights of the Termi-
nally Ill Act §§ 1-18, 9B U.L.A. 609 (1987 & Supp. 1991) (draft legislation recommended for
adoption in all states by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws).
84. P. WILLIAMS, THE LIVING WILL SOURCEBOOK WITH FORMS 7 (1986).
85. At least thirteen states and the District of Columbia have durable power-of-attorney
statutes that expressly authorize the appointment of a proxy for medical decisions. See ALASKA
STAT. ANN. §§ 13.26.335 (Supp. 1990); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2500-2508 (West Supp. 1991); D.C.
CODE ANN. § 21-2205 (1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4505 (Supp. 1990); ILL. ANN. STAT., ch. 110-1/2,
para. 804-1 to 804-12 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1991); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-625 (Supp. 1990); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 18-A, §§ 5-501 to -502 (1990); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.800-.860 (Mi-
chie Supp. 1989); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1337.1l-.17 (Supp. 1990); OR. REV. STAT. § 127.510
(1989); PA. STAT. CONS. ANN. tit. 20, § 5603(h) (Purdon Supp. 1990); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-
4.10-1 to -2 (1989); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h-l (Vernon Supp. 1991); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 14, § 3451-67 (1989 & Supp. 1990).
Furthermore, living-will statutes in at least thirteen states authorize the appointment of a
proxy for medical decisions. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-202 (Supp. 1989); DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 16, § 2502 (1983); FLA. STAT. § 765.05(2) (1989); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504 (Supp. 1990); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-8-11-14(g)(2) (1990); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.7(l)(a) (West 1989); LA. CIV.
CODE ANN. art. 40:1299.58.1, 40:1299.58.3(C) (West Supp. 1991); MINN. STAT. § 145B.04(e)(8)
(Supp. 1991); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 672.003(d) (Vernon Supp. 1991); UTAH
CODE ANN. §§ 75-2-1105 to -1106 (Supp. 1990); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2986(2) (1988); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.70.065(l)(b) (Supp. 1991); WYO. STAT. § 35-22-102 (1988).
86. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 378, 529 A.2d 419, 426 (1987). All fifty states and the District
of Columbia have enacted durable power of attorney statutes. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri
Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2858 n.3. (1990) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
87. The term "living will" was first coined by attorney Luis Kutner in the 1930s. P. WIL-
LIAMS, supra note 84, at 7. Bishop Fulton Sheen was the first person to officially execute a living
will, and actor Errol Flynn was the second. Id.
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their intent about life-sustaining procedures. First, only a small per-
centage of the population has executed a living will. 88 Second, even if
people have executed living wills, their declarations may not apply to
their present situations. Living-will statutes vary widely from state to
state, 89 and many states do not recognize a living will that was exe-
cuted in another state.9 Furthermore, some living-will statutes do not
authorize a person to direct the removal of a feeding or hydration
tube. 91 Most, if not all, of the states do not provide for a person to
direct the withholding of life-sustaining treatment for a nonterminal
condition. 92 A persistent vegetative state is considered a nonterminal
condition. 93 Therefore, a living will could prove inapplicable in many
different situations.
Even if laws are revised so living wills could provide directives for
all medical situations, "'[wiritten decisions made ahead of time are
not the best way to make choices about health care which is changing
all the time."' 94 An innovative medical procedure arising after a per-
son executed a living will could cast doubt on the past written direc-
tive. Medical treatment decisions should be exercised only when all
risks and alternatives are completely known. Therefore, a superior al-
ternative to exercising a living will is appointing a proxy or surrogate
to make medical treatment decisions on a person's behalf.
2. Statutes Authorizing a Surrogate to Make Treatment Decisions
People can ensure that optimal treatment decisions are made on
their behalf by delegating, while competent, the authority to make
health care decisions to a family member or trusted friend. Allowing
people to designate proxies to carry out their intent may prove a valu-
able safeguard of patients' interests in directing their medical care.
88. See Emanuel & Emanuel, The Medical Directive: A New Comprehensive Advance Care
Document, 261 J. A.M.A. 3288 (1989) (only nine percent of the population has executed a living
will); but see Nat'l L. J., Dec. 3, 1990, at 7, col. 2 (the Society for the Right to Die has reported
that the Cruzan case has spurred a tremendous interest in living wills).
89. P. WILLIAMS, supra note 84, at 11-12.
90. Id. at 10 (only three states will recognize a living will which was executed in another
state).
91. Id. at 11.
92. See, e.g., Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 214, 741 P.2d 674, 681 (1987) (the
Arizona living-will statutes do not provide a right to refuse medical treatment when the person is
in a nonterminal condition).
93. A terminal illness has been defined as one in which death is imminent. See In re Guardi-
anship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 265 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), approved, 568 So. 2d 4 (Fla.
1990). The court did not define the length of "imminent." Id.
94. Wall St. J., June 26, 1990, at A8, col. 1 (quoting Nancy Dickey, an American Medical
Association trustee).
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Unfortunately, less than half of the states have expressly authorized
the appointment of proxies for medical treatment decisions. 95 Even if
all fifty states authorized the appointment of proxies to make these
decisions, nothing will be accomplished if the majority of the public
fails to take advantage of this appointment power. Few individuals
provide any directives regarding their intent to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. People are "'just as careful to bury thoughts of death as
they are to bury the dead.' 96
Even if attitudes change and every competent person enacts a living
will or appoints a proxy to make medical decisions, legislatures never
will be able to avoid completely the problem of people who are incom-
petent and have never expressed their preferences. Legislation cannot
cure situations involving minors or those who have been incompetent
their entire lives. Such people have no opportunity to legally formu-
late their wishes. Therefore, the problem of deciding how to exercise
an incompetent person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment may
be minimized but never totally eliminated.
3. Patient Self-Determination A Ct 97
Federal legislation that takes effect in November 1991 will require
federally funded health care facilities to provide entering patients with
written information regarding their rights under state law to refuse
medical treatment and their rights to execute a living will or durable
power of attorney. 9 Each health care facility must document in each
patient's medical record whether the patient executed an advance
medical directive. 99 Furthermore, facilities must conduct educational
programs for staff and the general public on issues concerning ad-
vance medical directives.0
The legislation is designed to eliminate ignorance of the law con-
cerning advance medical directives for both patients and physicians. 0'
95. See supra note 85.
96. Fehren, Lord of Mercy and Compassion, U.S..Catholic 39, 39 (August 1990) (quoting
the writings of Jacques-Benigne Bossuet). "[A]t bottom no one believes in his own death, or to
put the same thing in another way, in the unconscious every one of us is convinced of his own
immortality." S. FREuD, Our Attitude Towards Death, in 4 COLLECTED PAPERs 304, 305 (1915).
97. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4206 (1990). The
law takes effect in November 1991, one year after Congress passed it.
98. Nat'l L.J., Dec. 3, 1990, at 7, col 1.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. 136 CONG. REc. E943-01 (daily ed. Apr. 3, 1990) (statement of Rep. Levin). "A survey
in Colorado found that 23 percent of doctors are not familiar with living wills, and 74 percent
are not familiar with durable powers of attorney." Id.
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However, it is important to emphasize that this legislation does not
create any new rights.? 2
B. Safeguarding an Incompetent Person 's Right to Refuse Life-
Sustaining Treatment: Solutions Adopted by the Courts
Courts have adopted various methods to safeguard an incompetent
person's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. The two methods
most often used in right to die cases are the substituted-judgment
standard and the best-interests standard.
1. The Substituted-Judgment Standard
The substituted-judgment standard is most often chosen by the
courts to safeguard an incompetent person's right to refuse unwanted
medical treatment.' 3 The objective of this standard is for decision
makers to reach the same decision that incapacitated people would
make if they could choose.'° The courts have applied the substituted-
judgment standard in two distinct ways.
Under a subjective version of the substituted-judgment standard,
courts require the inquiry to be narrowed to the person's expressed
intent. 105 The probative value of any general statement the patient
made in the past must be considered in the light of its remoteness,
consistency, thoughtfulness, and specificity. °6 Clearly, the best evi-
dence of a person's intent would be a living will that specifically ex-
plains preferences about life-sustaining procedures. 0 7 However, even
a living will is not foolproof and may be challenged as insufficient
evidence of a person's intent.'08 The subjective substituted-judgment
standard maximizes principles of self-determination and individuality
because it requires decision makers to abandon their own competing
ethical standards and focus on individuals.
102. Id.
103. Note, Equality for the Elderly Incompetent: A Proposal for Dignified Death, 39 STAN.
L. REV. 689. 708 (1987) (the substituted-judgment standard is the most commonly applied stan-
dard); see, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2854-55 (1990);
Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 751-52, 370 N.E.2d
417, 430 (1977); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41-42, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
104. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL. PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND Bio-
MEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LiFE-SUSTAINING TREATMENT I, 132
(1983) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
105. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 530-31, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613,
534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988).
106. In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 131-32, 660 P.2d 738, 748 (1983).
107. In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 378, 529 A.2d 419, 426 (1987).
108. Wall St. J., June 26, 1990, at A8, col. 1.
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Under an objective version of the substituted-judgment standard,
courts have held that actual, specific, express intent of an individual's
treatment preference is not necessary.'0 9 Clear and convincing evi-
dence of a person's intent can be derived from the context of an indi-
vidual's entire life. The person's religious beliefs, philosophical views,
life goals, and attitudes toward death are appropriate factors to be
considered." 0 "The theory of [the objective] substituted judgment
[standard] is that if we know someone well enough-her ideals, val-
ues, attitudes, philosophy of life-we can figure out how she would
have reacted to a new situation."" I
When there is absolutely no reliable evidence of a person's intent,
neither substituted-judgment standard provides any guidance. In Su-
perintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz," 2 the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts erroneously applied a substituted-
judgment standard to a patient who had been profoundly mentally
retarded since birth." 3 Such patients cannot leave evidence of their in-
tentions because they cannot formulate legally effective wishes." 4 Un-
der such circumstances, both substituted-judgment standards are pure
fiction and should be abandoned in favor of a best-interests stan-
dard."
2. The Best-Interests Standard
Only a few courts have used the best-interests standard," 16 which in-
volves the decision maker using a set of objective criteria to assess
what would be in the patient's best interests." 7 Life-sustaining treat-
ment can only be removed if the burdens of a continued existence
clearly outweigh the benefits." 8
109. In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 49-50, 549 N.E.2d 292, 299-300 (1989).
110. Id. at 49-50, 549 N.E.2d at 299-300; see also In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 361-362, 486
A.2d 1209, 1229-1230 (1985).
111. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 438-39, 529 A.2d 434, 457 (1987) (Handler, J., concurring).
112. 373 Mass. 728, 370 N.E.2d 417 (1977).
113. Id. at 752-53, 370 N.E.2d at 431-32.
114. Weber, Substituted Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 1 IssuEs L. & MED. 131,
145-46 (1985) (criticized the Saikewicz court for misapplying the substituted-judgment standard).
115. See In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 364, 486 A.2d at 1231; Note, Equality for the Elderly
Incompetent: A Proposal for Dignified Death, 39 STAN. L. REv. 689, 714 (1987) (substituted-
judgment standard is deficient when patient's intent is unknown); Note, Live or Let Die; Who
Decides an Incompetent's Fate? In re Storar and In re Eichner, 1982 B.Y.U. L. REv. 387, 392-93
(1982).
116. See Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 221-22, 741 P.2d 674, 688-89 (1981); In re
Conservatorship of Drabick, 200 Cal. App. 3d 185, 245 Cal. Rptr. 840 (1988), cert. denied,
Drabick v. Drabick, 488 U.S. 958 (1988); In re Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d 332, 337-
38 (Minn. 1984).
117. CO,,USSION REPORT, supra note 104, at 134-35.
118. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
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Generally, all courts agree that the amount of pain a person must
endure, the possibility of restored functionality, and life expectancy
are appropriate objective criteria to be included in the best-interests
standard."19 What is debated is whether quality of life is also an ac-
ceptable objective criterion. Some courts exclude quality of life from
the best-interests standard because of the fundamental notion that no
person should be able to decide what is an acceptable quality of life
for another person. 20 Other courts say that an accurate assessment of
a person's best interests must include quality of life.' 2'
3. Balancing an Incompetent's Right Against State Interests
Regardless of the standard used to exercise an incompetent person's
right to refuse unwanted medical treatment, the right is not absolute
and must be balanced against relevant state interests. 122 Generally, the
four state interests involved are preventing suicide, preserving the ethi-
cal integrity of the medical profession, protecting the interests of in-
nocent third parties, and preserving life. 23 The state's interest in the
preservation of life is generally characterized as the most significant of
the asserted interests. '
The state's interest in preserving life weakens, and the individual's
right to refuse treatment grows, when bodily invasion increases and
the prognosis dims. 25 Considering the circumstances of a person in a
persistent vegetative state, no state interest is strong enough to out-
weigh the person's right to discontinue life-sustaining treatment.126
119. Id. at 353-64, 486 A.2d at 1231; Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689; In re
Conservatorship of Torres, 357 N.W.2d at 338-39.
120. In re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 367, 486 A.2d 1209, 1232-33 (1981) (allowing a person to
judge the quality of another person's life would create an intolerable risk for socially isolated
people suffering from physical or mental handicaps).
121. Rasmussen v. Fleming, 154 Ariz. 207, 222, 741 P.2d 674, 689 (1981). It is important to
note that "quality of life" refers to the value that the continuation of life has for the patient and
not the value that others might find in the continuation of the patient's life. Id. at 222 n.23, 741
P.2d at 689 n.23.
122. Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 740-45, 370
N.E.2d 417, 424-27 (1977).
123. Rasmussen, 154 Ariz. at 216, 741 P.2d at 683; Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d
at 425; In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 348-49, 486 A.2d at 1223.
124. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 741, 370 N.E.2d at 425; In re Colyer, 99 Wash. 2d 114, 122,
660 P.2d 738, 743 (1983); In re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223.
125. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 41, 355 A.2d 647, 664 (1976).
126. In re Severns, 425 A.2d 156, 158-59 (Del. Ch. 1980); In re Peter, 108 N.J. 365, 380, 529
A.2d 419, 427 (1987) ("We find it difficult to conceive of a case in which the state could have an
interest strong enough to subordinate a patient's right to choose not to be artificially sustained in
a persistent vegetative state.")
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IV. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN Cruzan
Although many state courts have held that a right to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment is encompassed by the federal right to pri-
vacy under the Bill of Rights, the United States Supreme Court found
that the right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is more properly
analyzed under the fourteenth amendment of the United States Con-
stitution. 127 In Cruzan the Court recognized for the first time that a
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the due
process clause' 28 to refuse unwanted medical treatment. 29 However, a
state may properly decline to make judgments about the "quality" of
a person's life and assert an unqualified interest in life that is to be
balanced against the constitutionally protected interests of that indi-
vidual.'30
While a competent person has a constitutional right to refuse un-
wanted medical treatment, the Court did not recognize that same right
for an incompetent person.' 3' An incompetent person is incapable of
making an informed and voluntary decision;3 2 therefore, the Court
held, a state may establish procedural safeguards to ensure that a
proxy's actions conform to the wishes the incompetent person ex-
pressed when the person was still competent.'33 In Cruzan, the Court
held that the Constitution does not forbid the state of Missouri from
requiring clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent person's
wishes before life-sustaining treatment is withdrawn. 34
Ordinarily, the standard of proof in a civil proceeding is a prepon-
derance of the evidence. ' However, the Supreme Court has previ-
ously mandated that a clear and convincing standard is required when
the individual interests at stake are particularly important and more
substantial than a mere loss of money.'3 6 The clear and convincing
evidence standard has been described as "proof sufficient to persuade
127. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2851 n.7 (1990).
128. See supra note 9.
129. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2851.
130. Id. at 2853.
131. Id. at 2852. Although the Court's statement is unclear, it probably does not stand for
the principal that an incompetent person does not have a constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment. The best interpretation of the Court's statement is that it merely emphasizes the need
for procedural safeguards to ensure that an incompetent's constitutional right to refuse medical
treatment is preserved. See also supra note 80.
132. Cruzan, I10 S. Ct. at 2852.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1182 (6th ed. 1990).
136. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2853 (citing Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982) (a clear
and convincing standard was required in a proceeding for the termination of parental rights)).
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the trier of fact that the patient held a firm and settled commitment to
the termination of life supports under the circumstances like those
presented.'1 The evidence must be so clear, direct, and weighty that
the factfinder can determine, without hesitation, an incompetent's in-
tent.'3 8
The Cruzan majority also asserted that placing a more stringent
burden of proof on the party seeking to remove life-sustaining treat-
ment is appropriate because an erroneous decision to withdraw treat-
ment cannot be corrected. 139 An erroneous decision not to withdraw
treatment merely preserves the status quo. 4 The possibility of ad-
vancements in medical science, the discovery of new evidence of a pa-
tient's intent, changes in the law, or simply the patient's unexpected
death create the possibility that an erroneous decision eventually will
be corrected.' 4' Therefore, a state may apply a clear and convincing
evidence standard in proceedings where a proxy seeks to remove life-
sustaining treatment from a person diagnosed as being in a persistent
vegetative state. 142
The final issue before the Court was whether the Missouri Supreme
Court correctly applied the clear and convincing evidence standard in
the Cruzan case. Nancy Cruzan's mother and sister both testified that
they were certain Nancy would want to discontinue her artificial feed-
ing and hydration.4 3 Furthermore, Athena Comer, Nancy's close
friend and roommate, testified that Nancy had stated that she would
not want to live in a vegetative state.' 44 The conversation between
Nancy and Athena took place only a year before Nancy's accident and
was described as a serious conversation that lasted thirty minutes.1 5
The Missouri Supreme Court characterized Nancy's statements as "re-
mote, general, spontaneous, and made in casual circumstances,"' 146
and dismissed her statements as unreliable. 4 7 The majority of the
137. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613,
534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892 (1988).
138. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 407-08, 529 A.2d 434, 441 (1987).
139. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2852 (1990).
140. Id.
141. Id. The majority misconceived the relevance of advancements in medical science by
treating it as a reason to force a person to receive medical treatment against his will. Id. at 2873
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The possibility of a medical advancement is merely an additional fac-
tor in determining what the incompetent person would choose if he were able to do so. Id. at
2873-74 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
142. Id. at 2854.
143. Id. at 2874 n.20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
144. Id. at 2874 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
145. Id.
146. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
147. Id.
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United States Supreme Court simply concluded that the Missouri Su-
preme Court correctly applied the clear and convincing standard."'4
However, the Court failed to state specifically what evidence it would
find clear and convincing.
In summary, the majority of the Court held that the Constitution
does not prevent a state from applying a subjective version of the sub-
stituted-judgment standard 49 as the appropriate procedure to safe-
guard an incompetent person's right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment. Furthermore, the subjective substituted-judgment standard
can be asymmetrically applied in that the Court did not require clear
and convincing evidence that Nancy Cruzan wanted to continue treat-
ment. 10
A. The Concurring Opinions
Justice O'Connor wrote separately to emphasize the limited scope
of the Court's decision."' Although Cruzan permits each state to craft
its own procedure to safeguard an incompetent's right to refuse treat-
ment,3 2 Justice O'Connor suggested that each state should take into
account the proxy's decision to protect the incompetent patient's lib-
erty interest to refuse treatment. 3 Allowing people to designate prox-
ies to carry out their intent is a valuable safeguard of their interests in
directing their medical care, Justice O'Connor wrote. 5 4
Justice Scalia was unable to distinguish a right to refuse life-sustain-
ing treatment from a right to commit suicide.' He pointed out that
states always have had the authority to prevent suicide. 5 6 Even when
there is clear and convincing evidence that a person would wish to
withdraw life-sustaining treatment, state legislatures may decide
whether that wish will be honored because the United States Constitu-
tion does not discuss suicide, he wrote.' 7 Although the equal protec-
148. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2855 (1990). The major-
ity's general discussion suggests that only a living will or equivalently formal directive from the
patient when competent would constitute clear and convincing evidence of an incompetent's
wishes. Id. at 2874-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
149. See supra notes 103-115 and accompanying text.
150. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 2856 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
152. Id. at 2858-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 2857 (O'Connor, I., concurring).
154. Id. at 2858 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 2859 (Scalia, J., concurring). "Starving oneself to death is no different from
putting a gun to one's temple as far as the common-law definition of suicide is concerned.
Id. at 2861 (Scalia, J., concurring).
156. Id. at 2861-62 (Scalia, J., concurring).
157. Id. at 2862-63 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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tion clause '58 places some limitations on what a state may force an
individual to endure in order to sustain his or her life, the due process
clause'5 9 does not prevent a state from prohibiting suicide, Justice
Scalia noted.'60
B. The Dissenting Opinions
After emphasizing the grim details of Nancy Cruzan's condition,
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion' 6' said that no state interest could
outweigh the rights of someone in her position.' A state's generalized
interest in life must yield to a person's particularized and intense inter-
est in refusing unwanted medical treatment, Justice Brennan wrote. 163
Therefore, a state may only impose procedural requirements that en-
hance the accuracy of determining an incompetent person's wishes.'6
The procedural "safeguards" adopted by the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri do not provide this enhancement. 65
Missouri's requirement of a heightened evidentiary standard at-
tempts to safeguard an incompetent patient's wishes, but it discounts
relevant evidence. '6An incompetent person's wishes are better pro-
tected by appointing a guardian ad litem whose task is to uncover any
conflicts of interest and to ensure that other members of the family,
friends, doctors, and clergy are consulted, Justice Brennan wrote. 67
The guardian ad litem safeguards an incompetent person's wishes by
probing for more evidence, rather than discounting relevant evidence,
he wrote.168
While courts always have used a heightened evidentiary standard to
place the greater risk of erroneous decisions on a person bringing a
disfavored claim, Missouri cannot disfavor Nancy Cruzan's choice to
refuse unwanted medical treatment, Justice Brennan wrote. 69 The ma-
158. "No State shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
159. See supra note 9.
160. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2863 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
161. Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion was joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun. Id.
at 2863 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
162. Id. at 2864 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2870 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
164. Id. at 2871 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
165.! Id.
166.' d. at 2872 (Brennan, J., dissenting). For example, relevant evidence that would be
discounted includes Athena Corner's testimony that Nancy Criuzan had said she would not want
to live in a vegetative state. Id. at 2874 n.19 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. Id. at 2872 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 2871-72 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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jority claimed that an erroneous decision to withdraw life-sustaining
treatment is irrevocable; however, from the point of view of the pa-
tient, an erroneous decision in either direction is irrevocable, he
pointed out. 170
An erroneous decision to continue life-sustaining treatment robs in-
competent people of their right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment. 17' Their degraded existences are perpetuated, the suffering of
their families is prolonged, and the memory they leave behind be-
comes more and more distorted, Justice Brennan wrote. 72 This harm
cannot be undone by a later decision to withdraw life-sustaining treat-
ment, he wrote.'7 Furthermore, the event of such a later decision is
more hypothetical than plausible. 74
Justice Brennan also wrote that if an incompetent's wishes cannot
be determined, a state cannot automatically make the decision for the
incompetent. 7 The majority found that there is no guarantee that the
views of close family members will coincide with those of the pa-
tient.'7 6 However, there is no reason to believe that the state, rather
than a close family member, would be more likely to make the same
choice as the patient, Justice Brennan pointed out. 77 "Family mem-
bers are best qualified to make substituted judgments for incompetent
patients not only because of their peculiar grasp of the patient's ap-
proach to life, but also because of their special bonds with
him . .. ,,78 The due process clause 79 prohibits a state from doing
more than protecting an incompetent's wishes.'8" In summary, Justice
Brennan appears to support an objective version of the substituted-
judgment standard as the appropriate procedure to safeguard an in-
competent's right to refuse life-sustaining treatment. He would not re-
quire actual, specific, and express intent of an individual's treatment
preference and would allow family members to derive intent from the
mere context of his life.
Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, criticized Missouri's effort to
define life as the biological persistence of bodily functions without re-
170. Id. at 2873 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 2877 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. (quoting In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 416, 529 A.2d 434, 445 (1987)).
179. See supra note 9.
180. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2877 (1990) (Brennan,
J., dissenting).
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gard to Nancy Cruzan's individual interests. 18' He suggested that the
definition of "life," as it is commonly understood and used in the
Constitution, fails to encompass a person in a persistent vegetative
state. 82 "Lives do not exist in abstraction from persons, and to pre-
tend otherwise is not to honor but to desecrate the State's responsibil-
ity for protecting life."'813 Justice Stevens would hold that the due
process clause'" requires the state to act in Nancy Cruzan's best inter-
ests. ' 5
A court should not place an incompetent person's best interests to
one side and focus the inquiry solely on the person's prior expressions
of intent, Justice Stevens wrote.18 6 The constitutional right to be free
from unwanted medical treatment is not categorically limited to those
who had the foresight to execute formal statements of their wishes
while they were competent, he wrote. 8 7 In situations where an incom-
petent person's treatment decision cannot be determined, Justice Stev-
ens would require a best-interests standard as the appropriate
procedure to safeguard a person's right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment.
V. ANALYSIS
Every member of the Court except Justice Scalia would agree that a
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest under the due
process clause to refuse unwanted medical treatment. However, mem-
bers of the Court could not agree on the appropriate procedure to
safeguard an incompetent person's right to refuse life-sustaining treat-
ment. This section will analyze the various procedures used in previ-
ous right to die cases and will attempt to identify the procedure most
able to protect the constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical
treatment.
The initial question is whether a court should apply a best-interests
standard or one of the versions of the substituted-judgment standard.
In answering this question, it is important to remember that the con-
stitutional right to refuse unwanted medical treatment is an individual
right.s 8
181. Id. at 2886 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2892 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
184. See supra note 9.
185. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2879 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
186. Id. at 2882 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
187. Id. at 2882-83 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
188. Id. at 2855 (the due process clause does not require the state to confer the right to refuse
medical treatment to anyone but the patient himself).
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Both versions of the substituted-judgment standard are subjective
standards, 89 while the best-interests standard is an objective stan-
dard.' 90 Under a subjective standard an individual could choose a
course of action that objectively may not be in his or her best inter-
ests. Therefore, both versions of the substituted-judgment standard
attempt to maximize principles of self-determination and individual-
ity. A substituted-judgment standard should always be pursued before
applying a best-interests standard. 91 The more difficult question is
which version of the substituted-judgment standard is most appropri-
ate to safeguard an incompetent person's constitutional right.
A. Should Courts Apply a Subjective or Objective Version of the
Substituted-Judgment Standard?
As explained previously, the objective substituted-judgment stan-
dard allows clear and convincing evidence of a person's intent to be
derived from the context of his or her life. However, this standard is
premised upon a legal fiction.' 92 Some courts have even used an objec-
tive substituted-judgment standard to determine whether to discon-
tinue life-sustaining treatment for an infant. 193 Under such
circumstances, it is clearly impossible for a proxy to ascertain what
the incompetent individual would decide. In reality, the objective sub-
stituted-judgment standard is merely a best-interests standard with no
specified objective criteria for the proxy to follow.
It is this author's opinion that the objective substituted-judgment
standard merely allows the courts to avoid the difficult question of
whether "quality of life" is an appropriate criterion in a best-interests
standard. 194 When a court allows a proxy to derive an incompetent
189. See supra text accompanying notes 103-15. The goal of both the subjective and objec-
tive substituted-judgment standards is to reach the decision the incapacitated person would reach
if he or she were able to do so. Therefore, in theory, both versions are subjective. However, the
objective substituted-judgment standard is subjective only in a fictitious sense. See infra text
accompanying notes 192-95.
190. See supra text accompanying notes 116-21.
191. The substituted-judgment standard promotes the underlying values of self-determina-
tion and well-being better than the best-interests standard. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 104,
at 136.
192. "[lin the absence of adequate proof of the patient's wishes, it is naive to pretend that
the right to self-determination serves as the basis for sustained decision-making." In re Conroy,
98 N.J. 321, 364, 486 A.2d 1209, 1231 (1981).
193. See In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 446-47, 321 S.E.2d 716, 722-23 (1984); In re Guardian-
ship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365, 371 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
194. See Kamisar, Karen Ann Quinlan and the "Right-to-Die," 29 LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES
2-3 (1985) (Quinlan was a poorly disguised "quality of life" case which "badly smudged ... the
distinction between the right to choose one's own death and the right to choose someone
else's...").
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person's wishes from such vague notions as the context of the per-
son's life, the proxy is given wide latitude in arriving at his or her
decision. Typically in these situations, the proxy nominated by the
court is the family of the incompetent patient. 19 The court is implic-
itly allowing the family to consider the quality of the incompetent per-
son's life. The court also is implicitly allowing the family to consider
the financial burden of continuing life-sustaining treatment, as well as
other unknown factors. The objective substituted-judgment standard
is merely a convenient avenue for the courts to avoid specifying the
appropriate objective criteria to be used in a best-interests standard.
The objective substituted-judgment standard fails to protect all in-
dividuals with diminished mental capacities. In most cases an incom-
petent person's family will reach a decision that is in the person's best
interests. However, this will not always be true. For instance, a fami-
ly's decision to terminate life-sustaining treatment could be motivated
by a desire to end expensive hospital bills or to hasten an anticipated
inheritance. The only way courts can protect the incompetent person
from potential abuse is if the courts abandon the objective substi-
tuted-judgment standard.
In Harmon, the Missouri Supreme Court used the subjective ver-
sion of the substituted-judgment standard. Nancy Cruzan's close
friend and roommate testified that Nancy had stated in a serious and
lengthy conversation that she would not want to live in a vegetative
state. 196 Nancy's mother and sister both testified that they were certain
that, under the circumstances, Nancy would not want to continue life-
sustaining treatment. 97 The Missouri Supreme Court held that this ev-
idence alone did not amount to clear and convincing evidence of
Nancy Cruzan's wishes to terminate life-sustaining treatment. 198 The
Cruzan decision suggests that anything short of a formal declaration,
such as a living will, will fail to constitute clear and convincing evi-
dence of an incompetent person's intent.' 99 This is the essence of the
subjective substituted-judgment standard.
Justice Brennan would prefer that the states use an objective substi-
tuted-judgment standard, which allows the family of the incompetent
person to reach a treatment decision. However, he is ignoring the fact
195. In re Estate of Longeway, 133 Ill. 2d 33, 549 N.E.2d 292 (1989); In re L.H.R., 253 Ga.
439, 321 S.E.2d 716 (1984); In re Guardianship of Barry, 445 So. 2d 365 (Fla. 2d DCA 1984).
196. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2874 n.19 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
197. Id. at 2874 n.20 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
198. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 424 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan
v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841 (1990).
199. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2874-75 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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that the constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining treatment is an
individual right. 20° As explained previously, the substituted-judgment
standard dictates that a proxy must attempt to reach the same decision
as the incompetent person would make if he or she were able to do so.
The patient's constitutional right to refuse unwanted medical treat-
ment cannot be confused with an opinion poll. 20' A subjective substi-
tuted-judgment standard is necessary to ensure that the proxy's
decision would be the same as that of the incompetent.
Relying on a person's past conversations with friends and relatives
falls short of a clear and convincing evidentiary burden.20 2 Without a
formal declaration of what an incompetent person would choose, the
substituted-judgment standard merely amounts to a legal fiction.
The existence of a writing suggests the author's seriousness of
purpose and ensures that the court is not being asked to make a life-
or-death decision based upon casual remarks. Further, a person who
has troubled to set forth his or her wishes in a writing is more likely
than one who has not to make sure that any subsequent changes of
heart are adequately expressed, either in a new writing or through
clear statements to relatives and friends. In contrast, a person whose
expressions of intention were limited to oral statements may not as
fully appreciate the need to "rescind" those statements after a
change of heart.203
Therefore, it was appropriate for the Missouri Supreme Court to
hold that the evidence presented did not clearly and convincingly es-
tablish that Nancy Cruzan would want to forgo life-sustaining treat-
ment. Courts that have allowed parol evidence to constitute clear and
convincing evidence of an incompetent's wishes are applying an objec-
tive substituted-judgment standard. In conclusion, courts should ap-
ply a subjective substituted-judgment standard.
B. Should the Subjective Substituted-Judgment Standard Be Applied
Symmetrically or Asymmetrically?
The Missouri Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court
erroneously applied the subjective substituted-judgment standard
200. See supra note 188.
201. In re Guardianship of Browning, 543 So. 2d 258, 273 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989).
202. See Note, In re Gardner: Withdrawing Medical Care from Persistently Vegetative Pa-
tients, 41 ME. L. REv. 447, 458-62 (1989) (by holding that Gardner's casual statements clearly
show an actual decision to forgo life-sustaining treatment, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
has established a precedent whereby informal and abstract remarks become life and death deci-
sions).
203. In re Westchester County Medical Center, 72 N.Y.2d 517, 531, 531 N.E.2d 607, 613-
614, 534 N.Y.S.2d 886, 892-93 (1988).
CRUZAN
asymmetrically by not requiring clear and convincing evidence that
Nancy Cruzan would want to continue life-sustaining treatment. An
asymmetrical substituted-judgment standard affords no protection to
children or to persons who have been mentally handicapped since
birth. 204 Under these circumstances, there will never be clear and con-
vincing evidence that the person would refuse life-sustaining treatment
since he or she never was able to formulate a legally effective wish.
Therefore, under an asymmetrical substituted-judgment standard,
such persons will always be forced to continue treatment regardless of
their individual medical circumstances. By applying the substituted-
judgment standard symmetrically, however, such persons are pro-
tected since the standard correctly determines that the person's deci-
sion cannot be known, and the substituted-judgment standard yields
to a best-interests standard.
The Supreme Court permitted an asymmetrical standard based on
an assumption that an erroneous decision to continue an incompetent
person's life-sustaining treatment is a harmless mistake." This as-
sumption ignores the very reasons why people would choose to exer-
cise their rights to refuse life-sustaining treatment. People may
exercise these rights to avoid the perpetuation of a degrading exis-
tence. As Justice Brennan correctly pointed out in his dissenting opin-
ion, the damage done to people and their families by erroneous
decisions to continue treatment is irrevocable.3 Clear and convincing
evidence that an incompetent person would want to continue life-sus-
taining procedures must be required to safeguard incompetent peo-
ple's constitutional rights to refuse life-sustaining treatment.
In Cruzan, no evidence was introduced to demonstrate that Nancy
Cruzan would have wanted to continue receiving life-sustaining treat-
ment given her circumstances. Therefore, the result of a symmetrical
substituted-judgment standard would be that it was impossible to
know Nancy's wishes by clear and convincing evidence. Whenever the
subjective substituted-judgment standard fails to provide any guid-
ance, the best-interests standard must be adopted to preserve an in-
competent person's right to refuse unwanted medical treatment.
C. The Best-Interests Standard and the "Quality of Life"
Controversy
As previously explained, the goal of the best-interests standard is to
assess what decision would be in a patient's best interests by examin-
204. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2883 (1990) (Stev-
ens, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2854.
206. Id. at 2873 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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ing a set of objective criteria. By applying each criterion in the pa-
tient's case, the proxy must determine if the burdens of a continued
existence outweigh the benefits.
Courts have disagreed on specifically which criteria should be used
in a best-interests standard. In Rasmussen v. Fleming,20 7 the objective
criteria considered by the court were the amount of physical pain a
person must endure, the possibility of restored functionality, the life
expectancy, and the quality of the person's life. 208 Other courts have
strongly criticized the inclusion of the quality of life as a factor in a
best-interests analysis. 2°9
1. Ethical Considerations for Omitting the "Quality of Life"
from the Best-Interests Standard
Quality of life is the value that the continuation of life has for the
individual person. No one should be allowed to determine that the
quality of another person's life is inadequate and should be discontin-
ued. If quality of life was a legitimate criterion, then people with all
manner of handicaps might find the state seeking to terminate their
lives. For example, does a profoundly mentally retarded adult have an
acceptable quality of life? Does a person who is profoundly mentally
retarded with multiple physical handicaps have an acceptable quality
of life? The answers to these difficult questions probably will depend
on who is asked. No one should ever be able to decide this question
for someone else. While each person in these hypotheticals has a di-
minished mental capacity, it should be stressed that, unlike a patient
in a persistent vegetative state, each has some mental capacity. Re-
gardless of the level of a person's mental capacity and the extent of
any accompanying physical handicaps, quality-of-life judgments never
should be included in the best-interests standard.
The objective criteria to be considered in the best-interests standard
are the amount of physical pain a person must endure, the possibility
of restored functionality, and the person's life expectancy. These cri-
teria are more than adequate to protect individuals with diminished
mental capacities from enduring a painful and burdensome existence.
However, these criteria fail to protect individuals who are in persistent
vegetative states.
207. 154 Ariz. 207, 741 P.2d 674 (1987).
208. Id. at 222, 741 P.2d at 689.
209. See supra note 120.
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2. Why Courts Must Consider "Quality of Life"for Persons in a
Persistent Vegetative State
While a person in a persistent vegetative state never will recover any
level of functionality, he or she also is not experiencing any pain, and
the life expectancy can be lengthy. 210 Therefore, without considering
the quality of life for a person in a persistent vegetative state, it would
appear that continuing life-sustaining treatment is in the patient's best
interests. However, this result is unacceptable when the persistent veg-
etative state is fully understood.
More than a decade ago the seminal right to die case2"1 involved a
person in a persistent vegetative state. But despite the prominence of
that case, courts and physicians have continued to experience diffi-
culty in completely understanding the persistent vegetative state. The
Georgia Supreme Court incorrectly characterized the persistent vege-
tative state as a terminally ill condition. 2 2 In Brophy v. New England
Sinai Hospital 3 the trial court incorrectly decided to continue treat-
ment because a person in a persistent vegetative state would experi-
ence a painful death if the person's feeding and hydration tubes were
removed. 21 4 "Some in the 'Right to Life' movement have worked
long, hard, and successfully to create a false belief, even in many phy-
sicians, that to withdraw nutrition and hydration [from a person in a
vegetative state] is to 'condemn' a patient to a horrible, painful, gro-
tesque end. Nothing could be farther from the truth." 215
Even in the Cruzan decision, Justice Stevens noted that the Mis-
souri Supreme Court had said that if Nancy Cruzan has any aware-
ness of her surroundings, her life must be a living hell. 216 This again
demonstrates the misunderstandings that surround the persistent vege-
tative state. People in this state have no cognitive functions; they are
210. Cranford, supra note 8, at 31; see also Cruzan v. Harmon, 720 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo.
1988) (en banc), aff'd sub nom. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841
(1990) (medical experts testified that Nancy Cruzan could have lived another thirty years in a
persistent vegetative state). See also supra notes 26, 27, 53, and accompanying text.
211. In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976).
212. In re L.H.R., 253 Ga. 439, 447, 321 S.E.2d 716, 723 (1984) ("In the case of incompe-
tent adults who are terminally ill, in a chronic vegetative state with no reasonable possibility of
regaining cognitive function, we find that the family of the adult or the legal guardian may make
the decision to terminate life support systems . ) (emphasis added).
213. 398 Mass. 417, 497 N.E.2d 626 (1986).
214. Id. at 426-27 n.20, 497 N.E.2d at 631 n.20.
215. Armstrong & Colen, From Quinlan to Jobes: The Courts and the PVS Patient, 18
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 37, 40 (1988).
216. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2882 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (referring to Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (Blackmar, J., dissent-
ing)).
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completely unaware of their surroundings and cannot experience
pain.2 7 People in persistent vegetative states are little more than col-
lections of organs. 218 While Nancy Cruzan was in a persistent vegeta-
tive state, her body was a passive prisoner of advanced medical
technology.
Considering the quality of life for a person in a persistent vegetative
state does not offend the principle that no person should decide what
is an unacceptable quality of life for another. The principle is logical
only when an incompetent individual has some level of mental capac-
ity.
Consider the consequences of applying a best-interests standard that
does not consider quality of life to a person who is brain dead, but
whose body is artificially maintained. While a person who is brain
dead will never recover any level of functionality, he or she is also not
experiencing any pain. 2 9 The results are very similar to those reached
for a person in a persistent vegetative state. Without considering qual-
ity of life, it is arguable that the best interest of a person who is brain
dead is, ironically, to continue life-sustaining treatment. This is an ab-
surd result. The only way to reach a rational result is to apply a best-
interests standard that considers the person's quality of life. A person
in a persistent vegetative state is easily distinguishable from a person
with any other medical condition that might present itself in a right to
die case. A person in a persistent vegetative state has no cognitive
functions, and the condition is irreversible. "0 The only possible way to
obtain a rational result is to apply a best-interests standard which con-
siders the quality of a person's life. Once the quality of life for a per-
son in a persistent vegetative state is considered, the result is apparent:
life-sustaining treatment must be terminated.
3. Courts Must Distinguish Persons in a PVS from All Other
Right to Die Cases
No single procedure can be logically applied to every right to die
case. Courts must distinguish cases involving the withdrawal of life-
sustaining treatment for persons in a persistent vegetative state from
all other right to die cases. When a court is applying a best-interests
217. See supra text accompanying notes 48-56.
218. See Veatch, Defining Death Anew: Technical and Ethical Problems, in ETicAL IssuEs
IN DEATH AiD DYnIo 18 (1978).
219. By definition, brain death is the irreversible loss of all brain function. See D. MEYERS,
supra note 34, at § 4:3. A person cannot experience pain without the cognitive ability to do so.
See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
220. A person in a coma can be distinguished from a person in a persistent vegetative state
because most comatose patients eventually recover some cognitive ability. See supra note 43.
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standard in a right to die case where a person is in a vegetative state
and has no mental capacity, the court must consider "quality of life"
in order to reach a decision that is in the person's best interests. When
a court is applying a best-interests standard in all other right to die
cases, the court must not consider "quality of life" in order to protect
all persons with diminished mental capacities.
VI. CONCLUSION
State legislatures should attempt to minimize the occurrence of the
situation of an incompetent person with no expressed treatment pref-
erence. This can be done by promptly adopting Justice O'Connor's
suggestion to enact statutes that specifically allow the appointment of
proxies for health care decisions. 221 Ultimately states may determine
that the best solution for persons in a persistent vegetative state is to
redefine death to include the persistent vegetative state. Such legisla-
tion could be prompted by Justice Stevens' suggestion that the consti-
tutional and commonly used definition of "life" may not include a
person in a persistent vegetative state.m The availability of such a so-
lution will depend on medical advances in diagnosing the persistent
vegetative state and public acceptance of such a definition. Therefore,
the Cruzan decision may best be remembered for Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion223 and Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion. 22
4
Regardless of what action the legislatures take, there always will be
incompetent individuals who have not expressed treatment prefer-
ences. The courts must adopt procedural safeguards which are best
suited to preserving an incompetent person's constitutional right to
refuse unwanted medical treatment. The decision in Cruzan aban-
doned Nancy Cruzan's constitutional right to refuse life-sustaining
treatment simply because she was incompetent.
In deciding whether to forgo life-sustaining treatment for an incom-
petent person, a court should first apply a subjective substituted-judg-
ment standard. This standard should be applied symmetrically so clear
and convincing evidence is required to forgo or to continue life-sus-
taining treatment. In the absence of a formal declaration of the in-
competent person's wishes, the subjective substituted-judgment
standard should be abandoned in favor of a best-interests standard.
221. Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 110 S. Ct. 2841, 2857-58 (1990) (O'Con-
nor, J., concurring).
222. See supra note 182.
223. Cruzan, 110 S. Ct. at 2856-59 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
224. Id. at 2878-92 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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For some people, such as those with a diminished mental capacity
and multiple physical handicaps, the objective criteria to be consid-
ered in a best-interests standard are the amount of pain that the per-
son must endure, the possibility of restored functionality, and the
person's life expectancy. If the incompetent person is in a persistent
vegetative state, the quality of life should also be included as an objec-
tive criterion in the best-interests standard.
In conclusion, it should be noted that judicial intervention in right
to die cases takes too long and could infringe on the very rights the
courts should be protecting. 225 A guardian ad litem, the family, and
the doctors can follow the aforementioned procedures for safeguard-
ing an incompetent's right without court supervision. The state's role
should be limited to ensuring that the procedures to safeguard an in-
competent's right are correctly followed by the family, doctors, and
guardian ad litem. Courts should only intervene when there is a disa-
greement between these parties or if there is evidence of improper mo-
tives or malpractice. 226 Because disagreements between the interested
parties should prove unlikely, judicial intervention will seldom be nec-
essary.2
27
VII. EPILOGUE
Two months after the Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan, Nancy
Cruzan's family obtained a hearing in a Missouri trial court on the
basis of new evidence. 22 Three of Nancy's former coworkers recalled
Nancy stating that she would not want to live "like a vegetable. '229
The state of Missouri withdrew from the case, saying it had no further
role to play once the legal issue was decided. 20 Finally, it is apparent
that the state of Missouri was not concerned about the individual in-
225. In re Jobes, 108 N.J. 394, 423, 529 A.2d 434, 449 (1987). An alternate point of view
was articulated by the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts. See Superintendent of Belcher-
town State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 758-59, 370 N.E.2d 417, 434-35 (1977). Ques-
tions of life and death require the "detached but passionate investigation and decision that
forms the ideal on which the judicial branch of government was created." Id. at 759, 370 N.E.2d
at 435. The Saikewicz decision has been strongly criticized. See Relman, The Saikewicz Decision:
A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 233, 237 (1978) (criticizing the decision as "a new
intrusion of the judiciary into an area of medical practice previously considered the private do-
main of physicians, patients and their families"); Curran, Law-Medicine Notes: The Saikewicz
Decision, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED. 499, 500 (1978) (the decision's requirement of a judicial hear-
ing in every case shows a distrust and lack of understanding of medical care procedures).
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terests of Nancy Cruzan. In the eyes of the state, Nancy Cruzan was
merely a legal pawn. Again, the state's role in right to die cases should
be limited to ensuring that the procedures to safeguard an incompe-
tent's right are followed correctly by the family, doctors, and guard-
ian ad litem.
After the ex parte hearing, Judge Teel ruled that there was clear and
convincing evidence of Nancy Cruzan's wishes and gave permission
for her feeding and hydration tube to be removed. 231 Doctors discon-
tinued Nancy Cruzan's life-sustaining treatment on December 14,
1990.232 Twelve days later Nancy died. 233 After her death Nancy's fa-
ther commented, "We all feel good that Nancy's free at last. We
stopped a useless medical technology that was serving no use whatso-
ever. "234
While Judge Teel's decision was certainly crucial for Nancy Cruzan,
the decision has virtually no value as a legal precedent. The Missouri
Supreme Court's decision in Cruzan remains the controlling case in
the state.
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